Bolivia

I. Summary

Bolivia’s prior success in eradicating huge swaths of coca cultivated in the Chapare is challenged by a 23 percent increase in coca cultivation as of June 2002. Despite eradicating nearly 12,000 hectares of coca this year, constant replanting obliges the newly installed Sanchez de Lozada Administration to pursue a multi-year counternarcotics campaign in the Chapare. Alternative development initiatives in the Chapare continue to provide licit alternatives to coca.

The largest coca growing area within Bolivia, of both legal and illegal coca, is the Yungas. There, topography and history argue against a simple repetition of the policy of force eradication so successful in the Chapare. Limiting the expansion of illegal plantings in the Yungas are the principal challenges faced by the new Administration. In 2002, the GOB began putting in place the mechanisms to control the licit coca market and prevent diversion to illicit cocaine production by enhancing interdiction operations. Successes in interdiction, which have significantly disrupted the traffic and transit of drugs and precursor chemicals over recent years, have been somewhat offset by adaptations by Bolivian traffickers to a limited and changing supply of precursor chemicals. Additionally, Bolivia remains a transit country for Peruvian cocaine base. Over the years the GOB has also undertaken several projects to reduce domestic demand for illicit narcotics. Bolivia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Today Bolivia trails far behind its neighbors, Colombia and Peru, as a supplier to world markets of coca base and cocaine hydrochloride (HCL). Bolivia’s cultivation of coca is about half what it was at its peak in 1995, dropping from 48,600 hectares to 24,400 hectares in 2002; Bolivian law authorizes the cultivation of up to 12,000 hectares of coca for traditional use.

Any gains in the GOB’s successful reduction of domestic coca and cocaine production have been partially offset by Bolivia’s growing importance as a transit country for Peruvian cocaine base destined mainly for Brazil. Bolivia’s borders run through the most remote and least controlled territories of its five neighboring countries, presenting multiple natural routes for smuggling.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2002

Policy Initiatives. The successes of “Plan Dignity” were evident at the time of President Banzer’s resignation for ill-health in August 2001. The transition administration of President Jorge Quiroga, worsening economic prospects and the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections combined to constrain GOB initiatives that would have consolidated these successes. The rooting out of corruption remains a challenge for the Sanchez de Lozada Administration, one that will ultimately determine, to a large degree, its future success in advancing its counternarcotics policy.

Despite the transition from the Quiroga Administration to that of Sanchez de Lozada, 2002 eradication statistics (nearly 12,000 hectares) were the second highest ever recorded for Bolivia. The Sanchez de Lozada Administration maintained the strong forced eradication program in the Chapare of his predecessors, though the President did establish a “dialogue” with cocalero leader Evo Morales that continued through the end of 2002. Morales’ call for a “pause” in eradication has been rebuffed by the Sanchez de Lozada Administration, though it has shown itself willing to discuss a panoply of other coca-related issues in an attempt to avoid violence and economic disruption from cocalero roadblocks.

Even with a strong eradication effort, in 2002 the GOB faced a 23 percent net increase in coca cultivation—4,500 hectares over the 2001 levels, due to rapid replanting by cocaleros. The net increase in Chapare cultivation was 1,200 hectares, while the Yungas saw a net increase of 3,400 hectares. (The Apolo region declined by 100 hectares.) Due to strong and violent cocalero opposition, both the previous and the current GOB administrations have been hesitant to conduct forced eradication in the Yungas. The Sanchez de Lozada Administration is developing a comprehensive Yungas strategy focusing on interdiction. The USG is working closely with the GOB to rebuild DIGECO, the institution charged with regulating the commercialization of legal coca. This effort is an integral part of a long-term strategy of increasing interdiction efforts and achieving effective control over the legal market for coca leaf to prevent diversion to cocaine production.

Extradition. Bolivia and the U.S. signed a bilateral extradition treaty in 1995. The treaty entered into force the following year and mandates the extradition of nationals for most serious offenses, including drug trafficking. There were no extraditions from Bolivia to the United States in 2002.

Counternarcotics Alternative Development. USAID supported net coca reduction by deepening and broadening alternative development assistance in the Chapare region. Through September 2002, USAID reached 21,410 families with on-farm technical assistance, planting material, training and infrastructure. The GOB estimates the area of licit crops planted in the Chapare increased about five percent in 2002, to nearly 125,000 hectares. Social conflicts and frequent blockades, however, limited the percentage of investments made in production and road infrastructure covered by non-USG resources in 2002. There are currently 92 agribusinesses purchasing agricultural products and/or supplying agro-inputs on a regular basis in the Chapare, about 70 percent of which received direct or indirect collaboration from USAID.

The annual family income from licit agricultural products in the Chapare increased from $1,706 in 2000 to $2,055 in 2001; USAID estimates that further (albeit limited) growth occurred in 2002. The GOB estimates the number of jobs in licit agriculture rose to 51,000 by December 2002. By September 2002 the value of licit produce leaving the Chapare decreased to $19.5 million, down from $28.9 million in September 2001. This was due to sharp reductions in demand occasioned by the economic recession in Bolivia and the severe economic crisis in Argentina; demand rebounded considerably in the fourth quarter.

USAID’s alternative development program in the Yungas, known as the Yungas Development Initiative (YDI), through September 2002 completed 56 rural and small-town infrastructure projects, began implementation of 35 additional projects, and had 40 projects at various stages of design. These projects provide inter alia potable water systems, schools, coffee post-harvesting mini plants and other types of social and productive infrastructure.

In addition, the YDI has provided scholarships for 33 regional university students specializing in health provision and agricultural/veterinary science. The YDI has trained 35,100 Yungas residents in 454 communities in disease prevention and supported programs to provide successful medical treatment for tuberculosis and leishmaniasis to over 1,000 patients. The YDI constructed seventeen community sanitation units benefiting 6,967 people (with 34 more under construction), maintained and improved 37 kilometers of rural mountain roads (constructing three major bridges), and provided technical assistance in harvest and post-harvest techniques in twenty communities.

The YDI’s successful efforts with coffee growers are starting to demonstrate high-income alternatives to coca production. Work with seven of the eight Yungas municipalities has resulted in signed coca control and reduction agreements with six federations and over 100 communities, leading to certification of over 60,000 hectares as coca-free areas. However, only 54 hectares of coca were voluntarily eliminated since the inception of the YDI in 1999.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The GOB and USG continue to work together to expand the size of the Special Drug Police Force (FELCN) and its specialized operational units. This expansion included personnel growth of more than 15 percent, the upgrading of its existing physical infrastructure, and the basic construction of at least 14 new bases throughout the country. It also included construction of a national communications grid, establishment of several computer-based data banks and information sharing systems and the upgrading of operational and office equipment and gear.

In 2002 the GOB seized 101 metric tons (MT) of coca leaf, 362 kilograms of cocaine HCL, 4.7 MT of cocaine base and 8.8 MT of cannabis. In 2002 the FELCN Chemical Unit seized 240,403 liters of liquid precursor chemicals (acetone, diesel, ether, etc.) and 150 MT of solid precursor chemicals (sulfuric acid, bicarbonate of soda, etc.). It also destroyed 1,420 cocaine labs and made 3,229 arrests. GOB efforts continued to focus upon the interception of illicit drugs and chemicals, as well as on the detection and destruction of both organizations which bring chemicals into Bolivia from Chile and Argentina and those which transfer cocaine from Bolivia into Brazil and Argentina.

The Code of Criminal Procedures (CCP) was enacted to strengthen the state’s ability to protect its citizens’ rights while providing for more rapid prosecutions and findings. New procedures introduced in 2002 to implement the CCP complicated the task faced by law enforcement and justice officials to complete successful investigations and trials in a timely manner. The public also does not yet fully understand the process. The USG and GOB continued to work together to provide training for prosecutors, investigators, and judges. In 2002 the USG also supported GOB efforts to strengthen Bolivia’s prosecutorial institutions through the hiring of new prosecutors and paralegals to deal with the caseload within the deadlines fixed by the CCP. Problems with CCP implementation remain, however. Changes in the substantive Criminal Code are still needed to avoid prosecuting informants. Bail provisions and restrictions are not always applied correctly and the CCP limits the use of preventive detention. In addition, despite considerable training, prosecutors and judges (unaccustomed to the discretion under the CCP) often fail to apply preventive detention when it is called for.

Corruption. Bolivia’s small- to mid-sized trafficking organizations do not seem to exercise a corruptive influence at the higher levels of the GOB. The present government neither condones, encourages nor facilitates any aspect of narcotics trafficking. In 2002, there were no prosecutions of narcotics-related cases involving senior level officials. The GOB, however, aggressively investigates allegations and is prepared to take appropriate action in instances wherein investigations suggest current or former Bolivian National Police or other officials are involved in or otherwise implicated in narcotics-related corruption.

Agreements and Treaties. Bolivia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Bolivia and the United States signed an extradition treaty in 1995, and the treaty has been in force since 1996. Bolivia has signed but not yet ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants; both have been approved by the Senate and are before the Lower House for final approval. In November 2001 Bolivia ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons.

Cultivation/Production. At mid-2002 total cultivation of coca in Bolivia was estimated to be 24,400 hectares, with 18,700 hectares in the Yungas region (6,700 hectares over that allowed under current Bolivian law), 5,400 hectares in the Chapare region (all illicit, destined for cocaine production) and 300 hectares in the Apolo region (all licit). Total potential cocaine production in Bolivia decreased from 240 metric tons in 1995 to 60 metric tons in 2002.

Drug Flow/Transit. Most Bolivian cocaine flows through Argentina and Brazil. Trafficking patterns indicate that Peruvian cocaine base crosses into Bolivia in the Lake Titicaca region, traverses Bolivia’s La Paz, Beni and/or Pando Departments and then mostly enters Brazil. This cocaine base, particularly that of the lowest quality, is mostly consumed in Brazil. There are indications that some Peruvian cocaine base transiting Bolivia is consumed in the markets of Europe, Mexico and/or the United States. Some Peruvian cocaine base also transits Bolivia destined for Argentina, Chile or Paraguay.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). During 2002 the USG continued to support the GOB’s initiatives to upgrade its efforts in demand reduction. The Vice Ministry for Prevention and Rehabilitation undertook several joint projects with the USG, including: expanding professional training and certification to drug counselors; beginning a youth soccer league to promote drug awareness and offer safe and healthful after-school activities; beginning a drug awareness and drug information center; establishing a toll-free 24-hour drug hotline; and, establishing a mobile drug information unit.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The principal U.S. counternarcotics goals in Bolivia are: to permanently remove Bolivia as a major producer of coca leaf for the production of cocaine; to promote economic development and establish alternative licit crops and markets so farmers will have viable options to cultivating coca; to disrupt the production of cocaine within Bolivia; to interdict and destroy illicit drugs and precursor chemicals moving within and transiting the country; and, to reduce and combat the market for the domestic abuse of cocaine and other illicit drugs. The USG works through various programs to promote institutional reform and strengthening the elements within the GOB dedicated to counternarcotics.

Bilateral Cooperation. The GOB and U.S. Embassy meet routinely at all levels to coordinate policy, implement programs and operations and discuss and resolve problems.

INL, through the Mission’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and its Air Wing, directly supports and assists all interdiction and eradication forces (police, military, and civilian offices), including the Special Drug Prosecutors project. This support is established and defined under Letters of Agreements (LOAs) signed with the Ministries of Government and Agriculture, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The U.S. Coast Guard discontinued its long-term training operations, which had been operating continuously in Bolivia with rotating teams for over ten years due to Bolivia’s significant improvement in riverine counternarcotics capabilities. Goals within the LOAs reflect U.S. interests outlined in the Mission Program Plan, and were generally met or exceeded in 2002.

Road Ahead. Bolivia had a general election in June 2002. Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was elected president, at the head of a coalition of parties. Cocalero leader, Evo Morales, received the second largest plurality in votes, heading, in turn, an agglomeration of disparate political elements running against the status quo. Although the ruling coalition has evolved into an entity with sufficient votes to move legislation through the Congress, the appearance of the anti-establishment grouping demonstrated the growing sense of disenfranchisement among many voters.

The challenge for the GOB will be to eradicate aggressively for the foreseeable future, thus demonstrating its resolve to discourage continued efforts to grow and commercialize coca in the Chapare. Much of its future success with regard to controlling illegal production in the Yungas will depend on the GOB’s reformation of the systems in place to control the marketing of legal coca, limiting it to only truly traditional uses.

Bolivia Statistics

(1994–2002)

	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994
Coca
Net Cultivation [1] (ha)	24,400	19,900 [2]	14,600	21,800	38,000	45,800	48,100	48,600	48,100
Eradication (ha)	11,839	—	7,653	16,999	11,621	7,026	7,512	5,493	1,058
Cultivation (ha)	—	19,900	22,253	38,799	49,621	52,826	55,612	54,093	49,158
Leaf: Potential Harvest [3] (mt)	19,800	20,200	13,400	22,800	52,900	70,100	75,100	85,000	89,800
HCl: Potential (mt)	60	60	43	70	150	200	215	240	255
Seizures
Coca Leaf (mt)	102	65.95	51.85	56.01	93.72	50.60	76.40	110.09	202.13
Coca Paste (mt)	—	—	—	—	—	0.008	—	0.05	0.02
Cocaine Base (mt)	4.7	3.95	4.54	5.48	6.20	6.57	6.78	4.60	6.44
Cocaine HCl (mt)	0.4	0.51	0.72	1.43	3.12	3.82	3.17	3.59	1.02
Combined HCl & Base (mt)	5.1	4.46	5.26	6.91	9.32	10.39	9.95	8.19	7.46
Agua Rica [4] (ltrs)	—	20,240	15,920	30,120	44,560	1,149	2,275	16,874	16,874
Arrests/Detentions	1,422	1,674	2,017	2,050	1,926	1,766	955	600	1,469
Labs Destroyed
Cocaine HCl	2	1	2	1	1	1	7	18	32
Base	1,285	877	620	893	1,205	1,022	2,033	2,226	1,891